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Abstract 
Cross-border access to restricted government microdata for research has made relatively 
little progress. Recent developments are notable as exceptions. This paper argues that the 
situation is made more complex by the lack of a common general frame of reference for 
comparing objectives and concerns; this reinforces the risk-aversion in government 
organisations. Attempts to develop general international data access strategies therefore 
collapse to sui generis bilateral agreements of limited strategic value. 
One way forward is to decouple implementation from strategic principles. A principles-based 
risk-assessment framework, using popular multiple-component data security models, allows 
decisions about access to focus on objectives; similarly, secure facilities could be developed 
to standards independent of dataset-specific negotiations. In an international context, 
proposals for classification systems are easier to agree than specific multilateral 
implementations. Moreover, a principles-based approach can be aligned with organisational 
goals, allowing countries to signal strategic intentions to others without the need for explicit 
commitment. 
The paper uses examples from the UK, US and cross-European projects to show how such 
principles-based standards have worked on a within-country basis and may help to resolve 
immediate practical issues. 
Keywords: Data access, data security, international agreement, standards 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, significant and widespread improvements have been made in the availability 
for research purposes of confidential microdata from government sources. Although there 
has been some reduction in detail in some anonymised files arising from concerns about 
data matching, this has been counterbalanced by an increasing range of alternative access 
models. Whilst implementations differ widely across countries, greater awareness of the 
value of such data and an increasing confidence in the ability of National Statistics Institutes 
(NSIs) or other bodies to manage the risks of access via an expanded toolkit of solutions 
means that use of confidential microdata for research is becoming the norm within 
developed countries. 
The same cannot be said for sharing of confidential data internationally. In general, only 
highly aggregated data have been made available across national borders [1; 21, section 
VIII]. Researchers wanting to carry out multi-country studies have either had to restrict their 
analysis to these aggregates, or perform separate local analyses. This limits the inferences 
that can be drawn. For example, the ability of multinational companies to share knowledge 
across different markets is assumed to be a major competitive advantage; however, as no 
countries share microdata from businesses, analysis is based on intra-country activities. 
Moreover, the range of aggregates is usually restricted to those selected by the NSI, 
although ‘live tabulation’ tools (such as the one at AskCHIS: http://ask.chis.ucla.edu/) are 
addressing this.  
NSIs have very limited incentives to invest resources in exploring these issues. As Ritchie et 
al. [14, 18] note, traditional risk/reward perspectives restrict the incentives for NSIs to 
release confidential data within countries. Across countries, the risks borne by and effort 
needed from the NSI are larger and the benefits to the NSI (such as data validation) much 
less direct, attenuating the risk/reward dichotomy. 
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This can be seen as a chicken-and-egg problem: 
(a) Internationally agreed ‘secure’ technical solutions are not developed because the 
legal framework is not in place to allow this technology to be exploited 
(b) Legal arguments over what is allowable are not being considered because there is 
no agreement on how the security of a proposal could be technically ensured 
Ritchie [16] argues that law and technology are important when choosing a specific 
implementation, but are largely irrelevant when considering an NSI’s strategic objectives. 
The same argument can be made here. Is it possible to develop a general framework for 
taking forward international data sharing, such that each NSI can make decisions consistent 
with objectives but implemented according to their own specific situation? In other words, 
can implementation be effectively ‘decoupled’ from objective-setting? 
This paper suggests this is feasible by using a ‘network’ model to disentangle aims and 
implementation: set the functional standards, and let individuals address their own needs 
consistent with those standards. The framework developed in this paper is a way of 
describing risks and desirable outcomes, not a specification for ‘the’ way to do things. 
In this, the paper complements [16], which argued that strategic decisions about access 
should be taken without direct reference to law, technology or risk; these are enablers, 
factors which can allow or constrain objectives but do not define those objectives. That 
paper sought to break the link between objectives and solutions; this paper reinforces that 
point by shifting the focus to the characteristics of solutions rather than any particular (and 
country-specific) implementation.  
The next section describes some existing sui generis cross-country arrangements from 
Europe and North America, and the lessons that can be drawn from them. As this paper 
proposes using a standard-setting framework to break the legal-practical cycle, section 3 
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briefly reviews the literature on standards. Section 4 examines the ‘decoupling’ argument in 
more detail. Section 5proposes a specific framework and then shows how it could be used to 
both describe and recommend alternative security frameworks. It also looks at how such a 
framework copes with new technological developments such as the ‘cloud’ or grid 
computing. 
This paper is about how government bodies in different countries can develop a framework 
for agreement. Common practice is not the objective, but may be an outcome. Section 
6considers pathways to common adoption of both principles and practice on the long-term 
path to a true data-sharing network, and examines some of the practical difficulties that 
would arise. Section 7 concludes, offering some thoughts on planning horizons and whether 
the journey has value even if the aim is ultimately too ambitious. 
The discussion is relevant to all with an interest in international data access. It is also 
relevant for those interested in getting agreement between risk-averse organisations within 
countries where regulation is infeasible; for example, many government organisations 
generate confidential datasets with research potential but are unwilling to share them, even 
with other parts of government. However, for easeof exposition this paper assumes NSIs are 
the data owners interested in providing access to confidential data outside their own 
regulatory systems. 
2. Lessons from existing international data sharing 
There are international situations where the first barrier described in the introduction - 
developing specific technical solutions without an overarching legal framework - has been 
overcome. Current examples include 
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 The IPUMS (International Public Use Microdata Series) project www.ipums.org to 
harmonise and share confidential but anonymised Census microdata from sixty-plus 
countries [12] 
 ‘Mesodata’ models, as used in Airaksinen [2] for example, where semi-aggregated 
microdata are created from country-specific disclosive microdata with a view to a 
particular type of analysis; knowing in advance what models are to be run allows 
non-disclosive aggregates to be used to embody the necessary interactions 
 The ‘RDC-in-RDC’ model, using remote access technology to allow researchers in the 
US to access a research data centre (RDC) at the German ministry of labour [4]; the 
Eurostat-supported project ‘Data Without Boundaries’ (DwB) is piloting the 
expansion of this model to the UK and France 
 The Dutch statistical office’s use of contractual arrangements within the umbrella of 
European law to allow Italian researchers to have live access to the Dutch RDC 
(source: conversations with Dutch NSI staff) 
 The ‘Lissy’ remote job submission system allowing researchers around the world to 
run queries on confidential earnings data [11] 
NSIs also make ad hoc contract arrangements with specific third parties for processing or, 
more rarely, analysis.  
The five examples above are the results of single or repeated bi-lateral agreements. The 
typical model is of a small number of committed individuals convincing one or more 
governments to relax data access. As the legal and technical framework is usually specific to 
the particular case, it could appear that few general lessons can be drawn. However, it is the 
variety in these arrangements and the way they have been achieved that is instructive. 
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In no case has any specific law been passed or unique technology developed. In other words, 
these cases demonstrate that the feasibility of the solution has been less important than the 
willingness to achieve something. This is also very much the experience of within-country 
data access development in the past decade [16]1. 
3. The role of standards and networks in co-operative development 
There is a wide literature in management science on the development of standards and the 
roles that dynamics and the attitude of affected parties have on the outcome. Brunsson et 
al. [7] provide a summary and also introduce a selection of papers focusing on the 
organisational aspects of standard setting. Four elements of the literature, relating to 
tensions in the development of standards, are important for this paper. 
The first area of tension is in the number of participants in the standard-setting process. 
More participants can increase acceptance of a standard by delivering ‘input legitimacy’. On 
the other hand, more participants can make the likelihood of useful agreement more 
difficult. Examples of both cases can be found in the literature, and so the value of an 
‘inclusive’ or ‘exclusive’ approach to standard development is very much case-dependent. 
The second area of tension is the dynamic interaction between standard-setting and 
adoption or diffusion. As van den Ende et al. [9] note, the development of standards is rarely 
a linear process, and flexibility in development and an ability to respond to events or the 
interests of stakeholders may be key characteristics of a successful standard. However, a 
standard which is too flexible may be insufficiently specific to allow the gains of 
standardisation to be reached, and the standard is not widely adopted. 
                                                             
1  The Eurostat-supported project ‘Decentralised and Remote Access’ (builds on the proposals described in Brandt [5] and does 
exploit changes in European regulations, but the key issue is the willingness of countries to delegate authority. 
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Third, the voluntary nature of the standards means that there needs to be a reason for the 
adoption of the standard. Ideally, this would be through the ‘carrot’: the standard provides 
positive benefits which encourages compliance. However, the history of competition 
between standards suggests that the ‘stick’ is often more effective: standards adoption is 
driven by those with market power who have reached the critical mass to be able to impose 
their interests on others. For example, one UK government department insisted that 
universities wishing to be recipients of sensitive administrative data for research be holders 
of ISO27001 certificates (the International Standards Organisation’s quality marker for data 
security); as the department was a monopoly supplier of the information, standards-
compliance was imposed. 
Finally, the adoption of a standard at the organisational level does not mean that it is 
adopted at the operational level. The presence of an ‘expert group’ setting standards 
immediately creates a division between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, however wide the expert 
group; and this can lead to a lack of willingness to comply. Sandholtz [19] notes that this can 
be heightened when those responsible for implementing a third-party standard consider 
themselves equally expert in the topic and have no opportunity to contribute to decision-
making processes. In the context of international standards, it is the author’s experience 
from Eurostat meetings (where, by definition, all attendees are ‘country experts’) that inter-
country differences allow much scope to justify non-compliance, and so significant amounts 
of time are spent ensuring that standards address the likely objections of non-participants.  
In the economics literature, standards have received less interest, partly because the topic is 
seen as theoretically straightforward: if the adoption of a standard produces more benefits 
(which could include organisational efficiencies as well as direct financial gain) than costs, it 
would be adopted by the rational firm. Of more interest are the decision processes of the 
agent: how much effort should be expended in building a coalition of interest, whether the 
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network benefits of an open standard outweigh the monopoly benefits of a closed standard, 
how much effort should be invested in defending a standard, and so on. Again, the theory on 
this is relatively straightforward, and empirical analysis takes the same case-study approach 
as management sciences. 
One area of economic analysis that is of relevance here is the role of standards as a pure 
information device.  Many economic models typically assume a large amount of knowledge 
on the parts of the agents, but in models of missing information, standards have a role to 
play beyond the practical cost-benefit application. A standard may be the cost-effective way 
for an organisation to acquire the knowledge it requires for its business; it can also act as a 
cost-effective signal to other organisations of its own standards or activities. The interest in 
these cases is that it is unlikely that the organisation will have sufficient incentive to develop 
standards itself; there is however a benefit to society generally in developing such 
standards. This either encourages the formation of clubs of interested parties (if the gains to 
co-operating with others outweigh the gains from free-riding), or provides a case for 
government intervention. 
In the discussion below, two ‘standards’ are being discussed. One is a common terminology 
and security model – the way of identifying the goals of data owners. The second is a set of 
specific ‘levels of achievement’ for those goals – targets which some might feel are 
appropriate, others might want to strengthen or relax. For clarity, we will refer to the 
general approach and terminology as the ‘framework’ (a ‘process standard’ in the 
organisational literature), and specific levels of data security as the ‘standards’ within that 
framework (‘outcome standards’ or ‘design standards’, depending on interpretation).  
4. Decoupling principle from practice 
There is no universal view on the appropriate technologies for sharing data internationally. 
This should not stop agreements on principles, but in practice negotiations usually focus on 
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implementation: decisions about ‘what’ and ‘why’ turn into discussions about ‘how’. The 
solution is to ‘decouple’ these two types of problems. 
As Ritchie [15] notes, there are many different ways to provide secure access to confidential 
data, ranging from anonymised public-use files to remote-access research facilities and 
synthetic data. These have been implemented in different countries in different ways 
(sometimes within the same organisation; see, for example, the US Center for Disease 
Control’s restricted data web page at http://www.cdc.gov/rdc/). Although these are often 
complex solutions requiring statistical and policy judgments, the theory, techniques, and 
technology are all well understood. An NSI wishing to acquire a secure solution can pull one 
‘off the shelf’, albeit with a need to tailor the solution to its own particular case. The key 
point is that an NSI can focus on its own objectives comfortable in the knowledge that a 
solution can be implemented, somehow. 
The legal framework is usually seen as immutable, but Ritchie [16] argues that law is 
functionally no different from technology: it is a mechanism to ensure that objectives are 
implemented properly, but it should not define those objectives. The experience of the last 
decade in several countries demonstrates that the relationship between statute, custom, 
and institutional preference is rarely as black-and-white as claimed. 
This is the basis for decoupling: decisions are made on principle, based upon what the NSI 
aims to achieve. The wide variety of ways to achieve the same end relieves the NSI from 
concerns about implementation, and the NSI approaches legal issues knowing what it wants 
to achieve. An analogy is with computer networks: a standard specifies how computers talk 
to each other over the internet, but the actual devices used for this are irrelevant. 
For bilateral negotiations, it could be argued that this argument over whether principles or 
solutions are at stake is just hair-splitting, as the two parties will have to agree on a specific 
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solution. But the aim of this paper to is provide a basis for multilateral agreement and 
unilateral action; the improved efficiency may benefit bilateral discussions but does not 
restrict them. Again taking the example of computer networks, some organisations do have 
dedicated networks linking them to commercial partners. However, for most companies it is 
cheaper and easier to connect to the internet using open standards. 
The focus on principles works because it reflects the thinking of the NSI. Although 
prospective collaborators may ask questions about technical security of solutions, the real 
underlying interest is, for example, “can my data be transferred to the internet?” Decoupling 
makes these questions the basis for any agreement, not any specific technology or law. 
To build a general-purpose framework requires an acknowledgement that the questions 
NSIs ask will be different. Some will be more concerned about ensuring that the data 
themselves are confidentialised; others that any statistical outputs are non-disclosive; others 
that the system cannot be hacked into. Hence, a useful (and thus credible) framework needs 
to allow for multiple domains. 
For the same reasons, the framework needs to have multiple levels of compliance 
(‘standards’) within these domains. For example, countries might disagree on what level of 
training is needed to make a researcher trustworthy to access very sensitive data, or on 
what is meant by ‘anonymised’ data. The standard does not define ‘this is what you should 
do’ but rather ‘if you do this, this is the security level you will have reached’. Returning to 
the computer analogy, a bank can use basic internet protocols for on-line banking, but if it 
chooses to comply with the Secure Sockets Layer protocol then it is demonstrably 
conforming to a known level of transaction security. This is the model of ‘tight coupling’ 
where compliance with a standard is a positive stage in the assurance of a project [19]. 
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So, the task of the framework is to provide a flexible common terminology and model, and 
within that to identify appropriate ‘output standards’. However, simply using the framework 
as a taxonomy (that is, to describe and classify) ultimately is of limited value. The benefit 
comes from using the framework as the basis for negotiation amongst groups who may have 
wildly differing opinions on good practice. 
The key element is that details of implementation are kept to a minimum. An NSI wishing to 
deposit data need only consider what security questions it wants answering – the specific 
implementation is someone else’s problem. Similarly, an RDC could identify itself as being 
compliant to a given standard without making a commitment to a particular technology. The 
framework and standards, not the implementation, become the focus for discussion and 
comparison. 
5. The framework in practice: an example of standards and use 
This section details an example framework to show how useful standards could be defined 
and used, and how it could be extended. This section covers: 
 defining the relevant components of the framework 
 defining standards that reflect objectives 
 applying this to a set of extant solutions 
 designing standards for new solutions 
 accommodating future developments 
The comments below arise from the author’s experience in the UK, and from consulting with 
(or advising) Eurostat, the OECD, and NSIs in North America, Europe, and Oceania . It could 
be argued that there are too few or too many domains, for example, or that the risk 
assessments are wrong. These are valid points but not relevant here, where the purpose is 
to illustrate the way forward using a familiar model. 
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5.1 Defining the framework domains 
The domains of this model are taken from the VML (Virtual Microdata Laboratory) Security 
Model. This is a increasingly common framework for defining security as a set of ‘safe’ 
characteristics (projects, people, data, settings, and outputs), which are assessed 
independently and jointly; see Ritchie (2009). This model is employed across the OECD 
countries; it has been used to define (or has been adopted to describe) RDCs in the US, 
Mexico, the UK, and Europe; see, for example Wagener [22] on building a social data 
warehouse, Sullivan [20] for application to the health sector, and Hawkins [10] for the 
model’s role in designing access to tax records. Bujnowska and Museux [8] describe 
Eurostat’s interpretation. 
‘Safe’ in this context is a measure of risk, not a yes-no value. Thus, ‘safe data’ is the domain 
in which a particular dataset may pose more or less risk; a specific implementation will 
embody a level of ‘safeness’ of the data, which could range from no protection to very high 
protection. 
This is a system model: that is, assessing the ‘safety’ of data only has meaning in the context 
of the other domains. Less trust being placed in ‘safe people’ may be counterbalanced by 
restrictive IT systems to ensure the same overall level of risk; fewer checks on why or how 
people are using data may be possible because a stringent disclosure control policy for 
outputs is in place. 
For the purposes of this exercise, the standard domains of projects, people, data, settings, 
and outputs need some refinement, as shown in Table 1. 
[Table 1 about here] 
More domains and sub-domains could be added; for example, ‘safe outputs’ could be 
broken down into both the number of outputs that are checked and the standards of 
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checking that are applied; or ‘safe settings’ could include some system specification such as 
ISO27001. The above serve for illustrative purposes. 
5.2 Defining the criteria/standards 
In Table 2, in each of the security domains an illustrative level of protection has been 
indicated. These are then scored from 0 (implying no protection) to 4 (maximum protection).  
[Table 2 about here] 
So, to take the top row, a system which does no checks on researchers or projects bar the 
necessary administrative processes scores 0; a system whereby all projects are read and 
reviewed by an expert able to critically assess the context of the research gains the 
maximum score. Moving down, the ‘safe data’ scores directly reflects the identification 
possibility. Finally, along the bottom row outputs are scored from 0 (where no checking is 
done on outputs to see whether they breach confidentiality) to 4 (where nothing is released 
until it has been scrutinised by trained staff at the NSI).  
How does this relate to the principles of access? Consider the ‘safe settings (networks)’ 
option. The scores can be rephrased as: 
 “There need be no restrictions on where the data can be transferred to” 
 “I don’t want users to be able to easily share data with the internet” 
 “I don’t want users to be able to transfer data to outside the network” 
 “I want users to work in a restricted area of the network” 
 “I want users physically isolated from all other systems” 
The table can be refined further. For example, what is meant by ‘active training’? In the UK 
RDCs, this means compulsory attendance at one of the ‘safe researcher training’ 
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programmes run by the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) or the UK Data Archive 
(UKDA), the UK’s main social science data repository at the University of Essex. In fact the 
criteria could be made quite explicit: Eurostat has agreed [6] the elements of an active 
training programme designed to meet the ‘best practice’ level 4 (‘safe people (knowledge)’ 
in Table 2), and both ONS and UKDA follow this. However, even the Eurostat manual 
describes ‘what needs to be understood’ rather than ‘how this is done’. Hence it is possible 
to refine these criteria substantially without specifying particular implementations. 
Note that the scores cannot be directly compared across rows. The VML Security Model is 
explicitly pluralistic in respect of the safety domains. Hence a score of 4 on one criterion 
does not make a solution ‘safer’ than one which scores 3 on another, ceteris paribus. 
5.3 Applying the standards 
The vagueness in implementation is not an unwillingness to avoid commitment, but 
essential to the success of the framework. Government organisations tend to be very risk-
averse; preferred solutions are therefore, ex ante, ones which have been carried out before 
or are approved by someone else. With international data sharing, the legal and technical 
environment is different in every country, and so agreeing on what might be a safe solution 
is crippled by history from the beginning. 
For example, in France until 2011 business data were distributed to licensed users only after 
an intensive project approval process which included an oral examination of the applicant by 
a committee in Paris; in the UK, business data were never distributed but access was allowed 
via secure remote data systems, with checks on project validity limited to confirming the 
legality of the project. Arguing over which system is ‘best’ is a dead end: the basis for the 
implemented solutions is country-specific and arises from past decisions. However, it is clear 
that both France and the UK can describe their positions in terms of Table 2 and so the 
differences in perception can be identified within a single framework which aims to be non-
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judgmental and so agreeable to both parties. This may seem a small gain, but in terms of 
getting these organisations to begin discussions, this is a significant leap forward. 
Table 3 applies the above criteria to a number of different solutions currently existing. For 
example, in the first column of figures, the RDC ‘VML’ operates at level 4 (as defined in Table 
2) for checking project validity, but does little to reduce the sensitivity of the data. In 
contrast, only the data domain is relevant for unrestricted internet resources, and so 
anonymisation is used to ensure maximum protection inherent in the data. Note that these 
scores are examples from the author’s perspective and do not necessarily reflect the view of 
the service providers. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Thus it can be seen that the SDS has stronger incentives for people to act safely (scoring 4 in 
the ‘incentives’ sub-domain) compared to the VML (scoring 3). In contrast, the VML has 
more detailed data (scoring 1)and takes more interest in the non-statistical aspects of the 
project (scoring 4). The IPUMS solution relies upon the inherent data safety (scoring 3) and 
on its institutional agreements (scoring 4) to ensure good practice. 
This table does not say how ‘good’ any of the solutions are; it is positive, not normative. For 
example, IPUMS end-user licence datasets score the same or higher on every criterion 
compared to the UKDA EUL system. This does not mean that IPUMS is ‘better’ than UKDA, or 
vice versa; it simply means that IPUMS has decided that a higher level of security meets its 
objectives (this is not surprising: IPUMS’ security model is dominated by the need to meet 
the standards of the most risk-averse of the 60-plus countries that send it data). 
5.4 Designing international agreements using the framework 
So far, this conceptual framework identifies how different models solve the security issue, 
allowing an NSI to start considering which are the domains that are most relevant for the 
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data release under consideration. Note that a data owner can use multiple channels: in the 
UK, ONS supplies VML, SDS, IPUMS, and the UKDA with data [13]. 
The next obvious question is how this can be used actively to design secure systems. For 
example, Brandt [5] recommended short- and long-term solutions for pan-European data 
access. As a step on that route, the framework and standards specified here could be the 
basis for defining three levels of European ‘safe centre’; see Table 4 (again, values are 
illustrative). 
[Table 4 about here] 
Brandt [6] envisaged using the existing RDC infrastructure but the point of the standards 
model is that it is infrastructure-independent. If a remote-job model such as Lissy or RADL 
can meet the requirements, this approach says that it is a valid alternative to an RDC as far 
as security is concerned. The model looks for functional equivalence, not technical equality. 
Problems arise of course when comparisons are not homogeneous. Consider Table 5, 
illustrating the case of two NSIs looking to deposit data, and three potential hosts; for the 
moment consider only two domains: 
[Table 5 about here] 
NSI A would be content with all three solutions for hosting its data. The fact that two out of 
three exceed its standards is pleasant but does not affect the decision; there could be, for 
example, cost implications, but these are not relevant here. 
NSI B would be willing to place its data in Solution 2, but not Solution 1; but it is not clear if 
Solution 3 is an acceptable recipient. If NSI B requires that every minimum standard is met, 
then Solution 3 is not appropriate; if however, NSI B takes an overall view, it might consider 
that less training but a more restricted IT environment is an acceptable trade-off.  
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This approach cannot resolve these problems. What it does do is help interested parties to 
focus on what they want, and whether it can be achieved. 
5.5 How extensible is the model? 
This model distinguishes between ‘systems’ and ‘networks’ in access to data for research. 
Broadly, a system brings researchers together via a monolithic solution designed, and 
possibly implemented, by a single authority; this implies ownership and a central 
architecture, and is how most within-country data solutions operate. In contrast, a network 
focuses on gateways and communication protocols; what goes on behind those gateways is 
of no concern to the network.  
The focus on the network rather than system characteristics decentralises the decision 
making process and is designed to encourage innovation in solutions. For example, the 
world-wide web was developed without the need to change the basic operation of the 
internet which predated it by two decades. In the principles-based description of data 
access, not specifying particular solutions should encourage alternatives to be explored. 
For example, one area of current interest to data owners is the emerging field of ‘cloud 
computing’, buying ‘live’ computing services from third parties. Beecher and Leclere [3] give 
an example of using a cloud model to provide access to confidential data. This can be 
accommodated in the above framework, with data owners being able to delineate the 
difference between, for example, using cloud services and building their own solution. More 
importantly perhaps, the argument could be turned on its head: the framework could be 
used to define the service levels expected by the data owners. 
Two other developments suggesting opportunities for data owners are ‘grid computing’ 
(using multiple linked computers to carry out major processing tasks in parallel) and 
distributed storage (where the data files are kept separately and are combined dynamically 
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at the time of processing). The latter in particular is appealing for international data access, 
because it suggests the source data can always be stored in the country of origin.  
In both these examples, having a common frame of reference is valuable because it allows 
developers to consider when they might be crossing boundaries between ‘acceptable’ and 
‘not acceptable’. In a world of virtual or remote processing, the concept of where data 
actually ‘are’ becomes a real issue. This framework can help to identify which are the 
relevant points of concern. For example, ‘the data must be held on our servers’ immediately 
limits discussion; on the other hand, ‘I want to be confident the data cannot be accessed 
from places I have not approved’ reflects the underlying objective of the first statement but 
allows for a range of solutions. 
The downside of setting standards is that they themselves can become blocks to progress, 
however well-intentioned the original plan. This is particularly the case where network 
protocols cannot be changed without massive expenditure or disruption. By focusing on an 
abstract level, some of this risk may be avoided, but it is very possible that a framework 
devised now might be quite unsuitable a few years hence. 
Again, this is where the ‘specific vagueness’ of the standards comes into play. Van den Ende 
et al. [9] argue that the prospect for adoption of standards is enhanced by being able to 
adapt to the needs of those who were not part of the original consultation. It is difficult to 
predict where technology might go in the next few years. On the other hand, “I want users 
to work in a restricted area of the network that I control” is a flexible, but  implementable, 
criterion. 
Technological lock-in is a risk to be managed, and decentralisation can help by providing the 
incentives for competition. The internet is a positive example: the 1970s protocols, designed 
for a much simpler world, have been steadily augmented by new ones, driven by the 
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enormous success of the World-wide Web, in ways which the 1970s designers never 
envisaged.  
6. Issues of implementation 
6.1 Is agreement possible and useful? 
The framework described above is a simple illustrative model. Assuming, however, that this 
principles-based model was felt to be a useful way forward, could it be implemented as a set 
of standard definitions? Sandholtz [19] notes that standards may fail to meet their 
objectives for two reasons. 
First, standards are more likely to be a negative influence if imposed as a directive without 
relating compliance to operational benefits. Compliance is more likely to be achieved if it 
saves time or effort, or improves credibility. For example, both the VML and SDS adhere to 
the disclosure control standards laid down in Brand et al. [6]. Both RDCs already operate a 
similar standard, but by describing themselves with reference to an independent one they 
do not need their own statement of operating standards; moreover, they can compare how 
they operate against other countries who have quite different technical systems. This comes 
back to the ‘signalling’ function identified earlier. 
Second, the imposition of standards set by ‘experts’ may cause resistance in other ‘experts’ 
who did not contribute to the standards-setting. Although the multi-level approach to 
standards described here differs from ISO standards studied by Sandholtz, it does seem that 
the most effective way to kill any development would be to insist on a framework being 
adhered to. 
In other words, effective adoption of the principles-based framework is most likely where it 
is seen as positive, helpful, low-cost, and (ideally) in tune with the prevailing norms. The 
point of focusing on the principles of security to build a frame of reference is that agreeing a 
20 
 
framework can be done without any explicit commitment to meet any appropriate standard. 
This makes it easier, relatively, to get agreement. The multi-level approach to definitions 
also means that there is less for ‘experts’ to disagree about: disputes over taxonomy are 
easier to resolve than evaluating the relative merits of each other’s favoured solutions. 
For a more detailed exploration in the context of European RDCs and some of the 
implications for competition and innovation, see [16]. 
6.2 Paths to development 
As noted above, the framework can also serve as a way of specifying standards to be 
achieved when designing new systems. One possible three-stage development route then is 
1. Definition: a principles-based reference framework is defined 
2. Retrospective adoption: data owners/infrastructure providers begin using the 
framework to describe their systems 
3. Prospective adoption: the framework is used as a design criterion: 
a. Data owners begin using the framework to define their requirements 
b. Infrastructure builders begin using the framework to define their systems 
Most importantly, each of these stages is voluntary. Countries do not need to agree to the 
definition, or evaluate their own solutions. Use of the framework is a positive decision: 
because it is better than the alternative.  
This approach by itself does not solve all the issues of international data sharing; it is meant 
as part of a suite of methods for separating complex issues into more digestible 
fragments.For example, it has nothing to say about the legality of data sharing; this is not 
the purpose. The point of the framework is to agree the rules of engagement, with each 
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country being left to decide how its strategic aims can be met within its own legal structures. 
Only the point of connection matters; how that connection is achieved is up to each country. 
Van den Ende et al. [9] note that there is a time-dependency in the development of 
successful standards: early movers may generate ‘co-evolutionary’ responses in other 
participants. This has been the case in within-country data security: the VML Security Model 
described earlier was developed for ONS in 2003 but has since spread across several 
countries and into Eurostat publications. The apparent conformity of terminology has 
encouraged the wider adoption of the model into the data security literature.  
7. Summary and thoughts on future development 
NSIs take decisions on whether to invest in research infrastructure on the basis of cost, 
benefits and the security risks involved. The principles-based framework is designed to take 
the latter out of the equation, by making clear that all levels of security are available, albeit 
it at different cost. The framework is implementation-independent by design, and it requires 
NSIs to focus on what they want, rather than how the aim is achieved. 
The framework defined above is necessarily basic. Even if the framework were agreed as it 
stands there are many refinements needed. For example, ‘active training’ is marked as giving 
the most security, but what does this consist of? Should there be an exam and certification? 
Do all countries want the same training? How active is ‘active’? On outputs, is automatic 
checking of all outputs safer than manual checking of only some? Most importantly, can a 
linear model be devised – should there be, for example, several different ways of scoring top 
marks in a domain? 
Nevertheless, even in outline this approach may help to break through the tangled concepts 
of international data access, by separating out the security components which are important 
from those which are not. 
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Just as important as the concept is the scope for agreement. Countries are more likely to 
support a framework which focuses on effective taxonomy, rather than one which seeks to 
impose an implementation standard. The lack of reference to favoured methods or 
technology, and the explicit recognition that a variety of approaches have value in achieving 
access outcomes, makes acceptance easier. Even the long term aim, of such an approach 
being used to specify acceptable implementations, assumes that countries will want to do 
this because they find it beneficial, not because it is required. 
From the NSI’s internal perspective, the framework can also bring gains. Descriptions of 
what an NSI’s security policy aims to achieve are easier to align with corporate goals, 
compared to a more implementation-specific viewpoint. For example, ONS’ Data Access 
Policy, adopted in 2011, follows the VML Security Model exactly and uses the above criteria 
to describe all its data access options in one setting.In addition, setting security goals in 
terms of standards allows for multiple implementations to be covered by the same 
corporate policy, and for those implementations to be changed as the situation arises 
without the need to change the policy.This was done in 2011 when the Security Data Service 
became a third-party provider of data services to ONS. 
As noted, this standards-based approach only addresses the networkneeds for international 
data sharing, and ignores local considerations, such as particular legal structures. Also, the 
standard is necessarily voluntary. Hence, the vision of international data sharing discussing 
focusing solely on principles may be unrealisable. 
Is the journey then worth it? This paper argues that it is, for three reasons. 
 A common way of describing disparate solutions has merit in itself. For example, the 
multiple access paths in ONS’ ‘data access spectrum’ [13] can all be placed in the 
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above framework, allowing one to easily see where the differences between options 
arise. 
 The framework focuses on the principles of security, rather than the technology. A 
key recent development has been the recognition that security is an outcome, not a 
constraint. This framework makes that focus explicit. 
 The history of networks from the organisational literature shows that clear, effective 
standards are essential for their use and development; and that standards 
encourage innovation by lowering the cost of connecting to the network. There are 
many uncertainties about the development of technology, as well as approaches to 
risk; clarifying the network gateways allows innovation to flourish without needing 
to redesign systems. 
Overall, these suggest that the journey may be worth the effort even if the ultimate end is 
unattainable. This is a long-term proposal; even if the above framework were accepted now 
as it stood – which would require a sea-change in NSI perspectives – the move from 
retrospective to prospective adoption is likely to take some years. Moreover, the shift from 
implementation to objectives may have unexpected effects. For example, a natural 
implication of this approach is a stronger case for the outsourcing of data management, as 
organisational objections (unwillingness to consider alternative hosts because “we can’t 
trust others”) are explicitly being challenged. 
At present, international data sharing is a long way from any prospect of general 
arrangement or approach. However, over the last ten years access to microdata within many 
countries has changed beyond recognition – both in technology and in the approaches to 
risk and security. The similarity with debates over international data sharing is clear; the 
issues being raised in cross-country data sharing are akin to those raised within countries 
over the last decade, and which have now been addressed. Will there be a similar shift in 
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international data sharing? It is not possible to say, but this paper has tried to suggest a way 
in which the discussion may be usefully taken forward.  
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Table 1 Domains of risk in the extended ‘VML Security Model’ 
Domain Subcategory Meaning 
Safe 
project 
- Project meets legal/ethical/process requirements  
Safe people Knowledge Researchers have sufficient knowledge to use data safely 
Incentives Researchers have sufficient incentives to use data safely 
Safe data - There is protection in the data themselves 
Safe 
settings 
Access Connection to the data is secure 
Networks Opportunity to move data to other networks/media is limited 
Safe 
outputs 
- Statistical outputs are checked to ensure no accidental breaches of 
confidentiality 
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Table 2 Illustrative standards for desirable criteria 
Safe… 
 
score: 
 No protection                                                              Strong protection  
0 1 2 3 4 
Projects Administrative 
processes only 
(eg name and 
address for 
contact 
purposes) 
Check 
researcher 
background 
Check use is 
for statistical 
purpose 
Review by 
support 
officers able to 
critically assess 
feasibility and 
need for data 
Review by 
support officers 
able to critically 
assess impact 
of research 
People 
(knowledge) 
Administrative 
processes only 
Check 
researcher 
background 
Written 
assent to 
conditions of 
access 
Passive training Active training 
People 
(incentives) 
No effective 
sanctions 
Procedural 
sanctions 
only 
Mix of civil, 
criminal or 
procedural 
sanctions 
Civil, criminal 
and procedural 
sanctions 
Civil, criminal, 
procedural and 
institutional 
sanctions 
Data No data 
protection 
Removal of 
direct 
identifiers  
Identification 
within 
controlled 
environment 
unlikely 
Identification 
outside 
controlled 
environment 
unlikely 
without 
sustained 
effort 
Identification 
outside 
controlled 
environment 
not possible 
without 
exceptional 
effort/luck 
Settings 
(Access) 
No restrictions Access only 
from limited 
sites with no 
supervision 
Access from 
secure 
networks with 
no supervision 
Access from 
secure 
networks with 
occasional 
supervision 
Access from 
secure 
networks with 
continual 
supervision 
Settings  
(Networks) 
No restrictions 
on data transfer 
No internet 
access 
No internet, 
local/mobile 
storage or 
printers 
No access to 
other parts of 
network or 
mobile storage 
No network 
connection, no 
mobile storage 
Outputs No checks Random 
checks 
Random plus 
targeted 
partial 
checking 
Full checking 
except for 
‘experienced’ 
researchers 
Full checking 
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Table 3 Applying the standards for specific systems:  illustrative scores 
Unit VML SDS RADL LISSY IPUMS UKDA Internet 
Type RDC RDC RJS RJS EUL EUL  
Safe…        
Projects 4 3 3 3 3 0 0 
People (knowledge) 4 4 2 2 2 1 0 
People (incentives) 3 4 2 2 4 2 0 
Data 1 2 3 3 3 3 4 
Settings (access) 3 2 1 1 0 0 0 
Settings (networks) 3 3 4 4 0 0 0 
Outputs 4 4 1 3 0 0 0 
Explanatory notes 
Unit: 
 VML=ONS Virtual Microdata Laboratory, UK 
 SDS=Secure Data Service at the UKDA, UK 
 RADL=Remote Access Data Laboratory, Aus/NZ 
 Lissy=earnings data, UK/Luxembourg 
 IPUMS=anonymised international Census microdata, hosted in US 
Type: 
 RDC=research data centre 
 RJS=remote job server 
 EUL=End User Licence 
Note: scores are illustrative based on the author’s own perception 
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Table 4 Specific standards for European-accredited secure RDCs: illustrative scores 
 ‘minimum’ ‘best practice’ ‘maximum security’ 
Safe…    
Projects 2 3 4 
People (knowledge) 3 4 4 
People (incentives) 3 4 4 
Data 3 1 1 
Settings (access) 3 3 4 
Settings (networks) 3 3 3 
Outputs 3 3 4 
Note: scores are illustrative based on the author’s own perception 
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Table 5 Example of unresolved security preference 
 NSI wants…  Potential homes… 
NSI A NSI B Solution 1 Solution 2 Solution 3 
Safe people 3 4 3 4 3 
Safe setting 3 3 3 3 4 
 
 
